Banking CBOM Profilev0.1 draftUpdated 13 Nov 2026CycloneDX 1.7CC BY 4.0Finance

Post-quantum cryptographic inventory for banks and credit unions

A free, open CycloneDX 1.7 community profile for banks and credit unions: online and mobile banking, core systems, cards and ATMs, HSMs and payment connections.

For: CISOs, heads of IT and digital channels, cryptography and HSM teams, risk and compliance at banks and credit unions

Want help applying it to your institution? Book a 30-minute walkthrough

SHA-256e51064cffd0bbe17ec5da1f9415fcac18c9527be9abb8b8362dc7cb147996aab
Cite this profile
NetraScale (2026). Banking CBOM Profile, v0.1 draft (updated 13 Nov 2026). CBOM Community Profiles. https://bankingcbom.com/. Licensed CC BY 4.0.

Validated against the CycloneDX 1.7 schema. A starting point, not a compliance determination. Free to use and adapt under CC BY 4.0, with credit. Provided as is, without warranty; guidance, not legal or compliance advice.

Why now

  • NCUA Letter 26-CU-01, 2026 Supervisory Priorities (14 Jan 2026, US). Priorities for federally insured credit unions include information security, and payment system risks, where examiners assess governance, risk assessments and vendor management.
  • NCUA cyber incident notification, 12 CFR 748.1(c) (1 Sep 2023, US). A federally insured credit union must notify NCUA within 72 hours of reasonably believing a reportable cyber incident has occurred, including when a third party tells it of one. NCUA reported that about 73% of the 892 incidents notified from 1 Sep 2023 to 1 May 2024 involved a third party.
  • NCUA 12 CFR Part 748, Appendix A (US). Guidelines for safeguarding member information, including oversight of service providers that handle it.
  • US Executive Order 14412 (22 June 2026). Federal high-value assets and high-impact systems move to post-quantum key establishment by 31 Dec 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 Dec 2031. It applies to federal systems, not to credit unions directly.
  • OSFI Guideline B-10 (1 May 2024) and B-13 (Canada). Third-party and technology risk expectations for federally regulated financial institutions, including technology and cyber risk management.
  • EU DORA (17 Jan 2025). ICT risk management for financial entities, including a register of contractual arrangements with ICT third-party providers.
  • G7 Cyber Expert Group roadmap (Jan 2026). A coordinated transition to post-quantum cryptography for the financial sector; critical systems targeted for 2030 to 2032.
  • PCI DSS v4.0, requirement 12.3.3. Cryptographic cipher suites and protocols in use are documented and reviewed at least every 12 months.

A practical migration path

  1. Inventory online, mobile and open banking endpoints and app signing
  2. Map HSMs and the key hierarchy for PIN, card and core systems
  3. Record encryption of core banking data at rest and in backups
  4. Prioritise long-lived confidential data and long-lived signing keys
  5. Evidence progress for boards, supervisors and auditors

What's inside the profile

10 reference assets: 1 broken or legacy, 3 quantum-vulnerable, 3 review, 1 quantum-resistant, 2 post-quantum.

AssetStatusWhat to record
TLS 1.3 (online banking, mobile and open banking APIs)ReviewRecord each customer-facing and API endpoint; note whether hybrid post-quantum key exchange is offered.
X25519 key exchangeQuantum-vulnerableQuantum-vulnerable key establishment: highest priority where data must stay confidential for years (harvest-now, decrypt-later). Plan hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM.
RSA-2048 signatures (server certificates, code and document signing)Quantum-vulnerableQuantum-vulnerable. Inventory certificates and signing keys with their expiry; plan ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and crypto-agile certificate automation.
ECDSA P-256 (mobile app signing, device binding, passkeys)Quantum-vulnerableQuantum-vulnerable. Record where customer devices and apps depend on it; track vendor post-quantum roadmaps.
AES-256-GCM (core banking data at rest and backups)Quantum-resistantSymmetric: considered quantum-resistant at 256-bit. Keep; confirm how its keys are wrapped and who controls them.
3DES (legacy PIN, card or HSM key blocks)Broken or legacyLegacy: locate every use in PIN, card and HSM flows and plan retirement in line with your card schemes' and PCI PIN requirements.
SSH (administrative access to core systems)ReviewRecord host and user key algorithms on every administrative path; these keys are often long-lived and unmanaged.
Payment and messaging connections (e.g. SWIFT, ISO 20022, real-time payment gateways)ReviewInventory the cryptography on each payment connection; see the Payments CBOM Profile (paycbom.com) for payment-system detail.
ML-KEM-768Post-quantumTarget state: NIST FIPS 203 key encapsulation, usually deployed in hybrid with X25519 first.
ML-DSA-65Post-quantumTarget state: NIST FIPS 204 digital signatures.

From profile to evidence

Learn the risk in OpenRiskLab, check an existing CBOM in CBOM Explorer, build and keep your own CBOM in QDayRisk, and certify readiness in the public PQReady registry.

Related profiles

Contribute or stay informed

This profile will be updated to the CISA and NIST CBOM minimum elements when they are published. Practitioners, vendors and standards bodies are invited to co-author it under an open licence, with credit. How contributions work.

Propose a correction or additionAsk a questionTell me when it changes